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TORTS
GEoItGE D. HAnIBAuGH, jit..
In some of the more important torts cases decided during this
survey period, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the
right of an administrator to bring a wrongful death action on
behalf of an unborn viable infant, judicially defined the term
"unavoidable accident," interpreted the statutory requirement
that for an arrest to be made lawfully without a warrant the
alleged offense must have occurred in the presence of the arrest-
ing officer, and construed "malicious prosecution" to include
continuation as well as institution of the prosecution. Also, in
district court opinions, the term "social guest" was defined for
the first time in South Carolina, and a new exception was estab-
lished to the general rule that a civil action may not be based
upon perjured testimony.
I. PHsIcAL HIAT S
A. Prenatal Injuries
Fowler v. Woodward, a case in which a wrongful death action
was brought on behalf of an unborn viable infant, was a case of
first impression in the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Citing
Hall v. Murphy2 as "plenary authority that a viable fetus, 'hav-
ing reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable
of independent life apart from its mother, is a person,'" the
court reached a decision in line with the change taking place with
respect to injuries to unborn infants. It held:
Since a viable child is a person before separation from the
body of its mother and since prenatal injuries tortiously
inflicted on such a child are actionable, it is apparent that
the complaint alleges "such an act, neglect or default" by the
defendant, to the injury of the child, as would have entitled
the child "to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof ... if death had not insued." By the very
terms of the statute,3 this is the test of the right of an ad-
ministrator to maintain an action for wrongful death. 4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
2. 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
3. 244 S.C. 608, 613, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1964).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1956 (1962). See Gregory & Kalven,
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This decision was anticipated by the majority of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in their opinion
in the similar case of Todd v. Sandridge Constr. Co.5 A group
of comments on the Fowler case was recently published in the
South Carolina Law Review.0
B. Choice of Law in Interspousal Tort Actions
In the case of Oshiek v. Oshiek,7 a wife brought an action in
South Carolina against her husband, the driver of an automobile
in which she had been injured in Georgia. Both parties were
domiciled in South Carolina. The supreme court sustained the
husband's demurrer applying the general rule that:
[W]here an action is brought in one jurisdiction for a tort
committed in another, all matters relating to the right of
action are governed by the lex loci delicti. That law deter-
mines whether a person has sustained a legal injury. The
actionable quality or nature of acts causing bodily injuries
as tortious is therefore to be determined by references to the
lem loci delicti rather than the leX fori.
3
In a recent comment on the Oshie case,9 it is pointed out that
the personal immunity of the husband at common law is based
on a public policy of preserving domestic peace and tranquility,
on the subordinate economic status of wives at common law and
on the federal constitutional principle of full faith and credit.
Attention is called to emancipation statutes 0 establishing in
South Carolina a strong public policy of allowing interspousal
civil actions, to the fact that in most cases the husband carries
indemnity insurance, and to the possibility that the domicile
state may be left to foot the bill and the recommendation is made
that a weighing of the contacts, interest and policies of the two
states involved should favor the bringing of such an action under
the law of South Carolina.
C. Causation
In Wade v. Coplan,11 an action was brought by a meat cutter
against his employer of nineteen years to recover damages for
5. 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964).
6. See Figg, Barnwell, Taylor, and Haimabaugh, Comments on Fowler v.
Woodward, 16 S.C.L. REv. 439 (1964).
7. 2,14 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
8. Id. at 252, 136 S.E.2d at 305.
9. See 17 S.C.L. REv. 305 (1965).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-216 (1962).
11. 246 S.C. 6,142 S.E.2d 201 (1965).
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personal injuries. While working alone in a walk-in refrigerated
cooler which the plaintiff was responsible for keeping in good
condition, the plaintiff, while trying to hang a beef on an over-
head block, slipped and sustained a hernia allegedly as a result
of the defendant's failure to provide a safe place to work. The
complaint alleged that other employees under the defendant's
direction, in wetting and icing produce for storage, caused the
floor of the refrigerator to become wet and slippery, and clut-
tered with fragments of produce and humps of ice. The defend-
ant successfully appealed a trial court decision in favor of the
plaintiff.
A fellow employee of the plaintiff's testified that prior to the
accident he had carried into the cooler sacks of produce which
had been dripping water. The witness also testified to the unus-
ual presence in the cooler of a wire buggy through which frag-
ments of ice must have fallen to the floor. The plaintiff testified
that the floor of the cooler "was not wet," that it was so foggy
in the box that he could not see the floor, and that the only thing
he knew was that he slipped. He further testified that on the
night before the accident he had performed a customary task of
cleaning the floor of the cooler and putting down fresh sawdust
to absorb any excess moisture and increase traction.
The supreme court found that there was nothing to suggest
that enough water, ice or vegetable fragments had fallen upon
the fresh sawdust to wet the floor or to make it slippery or
hazardous and that therefore a decision that plaintiff's fall re-
sulted from the presence of water, ice or debris on the floor would
of necessity rest upon conjecture rather than evidence. It held
that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, was not sufficient to raise a jury issue as to causitive negli-
gence of the defendant.
The case of Grantham v. Fishing Boat Redwing,12 was brought
by the libellant under the Jones Act'3 for the wrongful death of
his decedent who drowned while serving as a member of the crew
of respondent's fishing boat and as he bathed in a tidal river
beside the docked boat. The district court found as a matter of
fact that:
[I]f there were life jackets aboard, they were not accessible,
and the record reveals no knowledge on the part of the crew
12. 234 F. Supp. 89 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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was had as to their whereabouts. No drills or instructions
were given the crew, and no equipment was in either purse
boat. At the time of the fatality neither Captain nor mate
was supervising.14
The court then found as a matter of fact and law that the afore-
mentioned acts of negligence were the sole cause of the decedent's
death and proceeded to quote from the case of iSadle v . Pennsyl-
vania R.R.
One cannot escape the conclusion that the drowning of the
decedent was a wholly unnecessary tragedy, and that, with
decedent struggling in the water and calling for help and
with a half dozen or more employees trying to help him, he
could have been saved if adequate lifesaving equipment had
been at hand .... [I]t is of the utmost importance that life-
saving equipment be placed where it will be needed and
where in case of the excitement of an emergney such as
existed here it will not be overlooked. 16
In Vlaley v. BfC.Ateer, 17 the car of one Dixon (who made a
payment to the plaintiff under a covenant not to enforce a judg-
ment) struck the rear of the defendant's car as both were pro-
ceeding southward. Both cars came to rest in the southbound lane
of the roadway with the Dixon car behind and to the north of
the defendant's car. Shortly after the collision, the plaintiff was
injured when the automobile in which she was riding came on
the scene travelling south and struck the Dixon car in the rear.
The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to show any actionable negli-
gence on his part and the plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed
on the grounds that there was (1) a total absence of evidence to
sustain the claim that the defendant had caused the initial colli-
sion by failing to give proper warning and (2) that in view of
the only reasonable inference from the record that the wreck
would have happened even if the defendant had moved his
vehicle before the plaintiff's car arrived, the defendant's failure
to move it-the only other negligence complained of-was not
causal.
14. Supra note 12, at 91.
15. 159 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1947).
16. Id. at 786.
17. 245 S.C. 592, 141 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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In Simmons v. Fenters,'8 it was held that a plaintiff, who
sustained injuries and damages in a collision which resulted from
the separte but concurrent negligence of the defendant and a
third driver and who elected to bring suit against only one joint
tort-feasor, who was entitled to a judgment against such defend-
ant. Quoting from the case. of Pendleton v. Columbia Ry. Gas &
Elec. Co.,19 the court stated:
That a single injury, which is the proximate result of the
separate and independent acts of negligence of two or more
parties, subjects the tort-feasors, even in the absence of com-
munity of design or concert of action to a liability which is
both joint and several, is a proposition recognized and ap-
proved in this State and supported by the great weight of
authority elsewhere2 0
E. Unavoidable Accident
In Collins v. Thomas,21 the plaintiff sought damages for per-
sonal injuries incurred when the automobile in which she was a
passenger stopped at a railroad crossing and was struck from the
rear by the automobile of the defendant. The question decided
on appeal was that of the applicability to any of the issues raised
by the pleadings or evidence of the following instruction to the
jury:
A defendant cannot be held liable for what is called a mere
accident or an unavoidable accident, which may be defined
as an occurrence not proximately due to, or caused by, either
in whole or in part, any negligence or willfulness on the part
of any person. In other words, such occurrence as is free
from fault arising from human agency.
22
The evidence indicated that in a twenty-five miles-per-hour
speed zone on a clear day with no obstruction to his vision, the
teenage defendant drove an automobile equipped with good tires
and efficient brakes into the rear of the plaintiff's automobile
driving it in turn into the rear of a preceding car and causing
extensive damage. The defendant laid down skid marks esti-
18. 233 F. Supp. 550 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
19. 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E. 265 (1926).
20. Id. at 331, 131 S.E. at 267.
21. 244 S.C. 128, 135 S.E2d 754 (1964).
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mated by an investigating patrolman to be thirty-eight feet long.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the presence of
sand and gravel on the road surface could reasonably have been
found to have caused the accident without negligence on the part
of either party, and found instead that an emergency situation
was created by the negligence of one or both of the drivers before
the condition of the highway could possibly have been a factor.
Finding no South Carolina decision to be in point, the court
based affirmance of the trial court's order (granting the plain-
tiff a new trial) on "the proposition that such an instruction is
inappropriate where the evidence shows clearly that the accident
was caused or contributed to by the negligence of one or more of
the parties.123
F. Statutory Standards of Care
The application of a standard of care set by a state and a fed-
eral statute is illustrated respectively by the cases of Simmons v.
Fenters,24 which is considered above under Joint Tort-Feasors,
and Grantham v. Fishing Boat Redwing 25 which is considered
above under Causation. Citing West v. Sowel26 and Field v.
Gregory,27 the district court held that the violation by the de-
fendant in Simmons of sections 46-405 ("General rule for turning
movements") and 46406 ("Signals required for turning or stop-
ping") of the South Carolina Code constituted negligence per se
or negligence as a matter of law. Such negligence, the West
opinion adds, is actionable if it proximately caused injury to the
plaintiff, and, according to the Field case, whether such negli-
gence per se constituted a proximate cause to the plaintiff's
injury is ordinarily a question for the jury.
In finding the defendant in the Grantham case negligent under
the Jones Act,28 the district court had to determine whether the
injury or death complained of resulted "in whole or in part from
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to
its negligence, in its . . . boats wharves or other equipment."
2 9
23. See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1959).
24. 233 F. Supp. 550 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
25. 234 F. Supp. 89 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
26. 237 S.C. 641, 118 S.E.2d 692 (1961).
27. 230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E.2d 15 (1956).
28. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1954).
29. Ibid.
6
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This statutory language was construed by the court sitting as a
jury to require the following test:
Under this statute [Jones Act]30 the test of a jury case is
simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion
that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest,
in producing the injury or death for which damages are
sought.31
The court in Simmons stated that the defendant was also
guilty of common law negligence in that he failed to exercise due
care when he attempted to make a sudden left-hand turn without
signaling from the state highway in the path of an oncoming
automobile. A similar suggestion is found in the Grantham
opinion in which the court states that although the tragedy took
place in territorial waters, the ship was not relieved of the duty
of due diligence in the effort to save its hapless crewman.
G. Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Detyens Shipyards, Inc. v. Marine Indus., Inc., 2 the re-
spondent was held liable for damages which occurred when the
captain of the respondent's tug failed to discontinue the voyage
when there was an opportunity to do so and continued to tow the
libelant's drydock in a hazardous and untried manner. Even
though there was no direct evidence to establish the cause of the
sinking, the district court held that in a case of this nature, in
which there is substantial testimony that the drydock was sea-
worthy, and in which there is no testimony that any unusual
hazards of the sea were encountered, the rule laid down in The
Anaconda33 becomes applicable:
Towage is not a bailment and the tug is not an insurer.
The burden of proving negligence rests upon the tow.34 But
when an accident occurs under circumstances in which it
would not ordinarily have occurred had the proper care
been exercised, there is imposed upon the tug the duty of
proving that the proper care was exercised. This is merely
30. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1954).
31. The test was set forth in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S.
521 (1957) ; accord, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
32. 234 F. Supp. 411 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
33. 164 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1947).




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH OARO=A LAW REVW
the application in admiralty of the well known rule of res
ipsa loquitur.88
Compare the above statement from Detyens Shipyards with the
following views expressed earlier by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Shepherd v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.86
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not recognized in the
decisions of this court but the efficacy of circumstantial
evidence to prove negligence is .... [I]n some instances at
least, ... the fact that the evidence does not clearly disclose
the cause of an accident does not necessarily exculpate the
defendant. 7
H. Absolute Liability
In Long v. United States, 8 the plaintiff's leg was nearly
amputated when he was dragged across the blade of a mowing
machine by a team of mules frightened by an army helicopter
flying at tree top level over the plaintiff's field. The district
court held the defendant liable irrespective of its actionable
negligence in accordance with the South Carolina statute which
provides:
The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the
land or waters of this State is absolutely liable for injuries
to persons or property on the land or water beneath caused
by ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping
or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was
negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in
part by the negligence of the person injured or of the
owner or bailee of the property injured.3 9
Although a permit signed by the plaintiff authorizing the army
to enter upon his land during maneuvers placed him on notice
that airplanes and helicopters would be used, it was held not to
be a bar or defense to the action.
35. Detyens Shipyards, Inc. v. Marine Indus., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 411, 414
(E.D.S.C. 1964).
36. 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958).
37. Id. at 540, 542; 106 S.E.2d at 383.
38. 241 F. Supp. 286 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-6 (1962). THE FEDERAL TORTS CLAimS Acr, 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1962) provides that the United States shall be liable "if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."
[Vol. 18
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The past year's cases furnish the following examples of a plain-
tiff's conduct which contributed, as a proximate cause, to the
injuries which the plaintiff complained of:
(1) On a clear day at a crossing with an ample and unob-
structed view of an approaching train, the plaintiff's intestate,
thirty-five year old man with good eyesight and good hearing,
approached the crossing at a very slow speed and drove into the
path of the train which had failed to give the statutory crossing
signals. Wingate v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.
40
(2) While visiting a patient at a veterans' administration hos-
pital, the plaintiff was injured when she sat on a shaky checker-
board table which "someone" had furnished her. Craft v. United
States.4
1
(3) A plaintiff who was driving on a primary highway was
injured in a collision when he failed to observe and obey a soldier
who stood in an intersection and motioned the plaintiff's oncom-
ing truck to stop and give way to an army vehicle which was
approaching on a secondary highway. Kirkland v. United
States.4
2
In other cases the court upheld jury findings that plaintiffs
had not been contributorily negligent when:
(1) A sixty-five year old woman who had never been at the
immediate location before was injured when she stepped into
an unseen hole in an Aiken city sidewalk while she was watching
the traffic light preparatory to crossing the street. Kelley v.
City of Aiken.
43
(2) At the defendant's supermarket which the plaintiff pa-
tronized only occasionally, the plaintiff was injured when she
stepped into a hole in the defendant's sidewalk which was ob-
scured by the curb and the grocery bag she was holding. Abeles
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
44
(3) An adult plaintiff driving a motorcycle on a narrow dirt
road on a clear day at a moderate rate of speed changed from the
right to the left rut to avoid a wet spot and was injured when the
40. 244 S.C. 332, 137 S.E.2d 258 (1964).
41. 237 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
42. 241 F. Supp. 198 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
43. 245 S.C. 503, 141 S.E.2d 651 (1965).
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road caved in to a depth of two feet at a point where the defend-
ant highway department was on constructive notice of previous
washouts. Campbell v. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep)t.
45
(4) The plaintiff's decedent, guest passenger in a car which
raced for ten miles, did not take advantage of an opportunity to
leave the car when it stopped near Adrien as he had no reason
to anticipate that the defendant would engage in another race
on the way back. Singleton v. Hughes.46
J. Plaintiff's Sole Negligence
The district court found the plaintiff's injuries or damages
had been caused by the sole negligence of the plaintiff in cases
where:
(1) On a clear, dry day with good visability, the plaintiff's
eighty-year-old decedent drove through a stop sign at a high
rate of speed into the path of defendant who was proceeding
with ordinary care and caution for the safety of himself and
others. Copeland v. Petroleum Transit o.47
(2) The plaintiff lost her footing while descending the well-
lighted stairway of defendant's rooming house in which she was
a paying guest. Hadden v. Mo~aughlin.
48
(3) The inexpert handling of the Ocean Queen by its captain,
the respondent, in approaching the Plover caused a collision with
the latter vessel while it was dead in the water with its engines
stopped. United States v. Vereen.49
K. Assumption of Risk
In Lawless v. Fraser,"0 the plaintiff who had worked as a
service station attendant for thirteen years was sent by his em-
ployer to the defendant's home to help him start his car. When
he was unable to do so with a booster battery, the defendant who
was in a hurry to get to the office requested that his car be
pushed with the service truck and that the plaintiff stand on the
bumper of the stalled car so that the bumpers of the two vehicles
45. 244 S.C. 186, 135 S.E.2d 838 (1964).
46. 245 S.C. 169, 139 S.E.2d 747 (1965).
47. 233 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
48. 237 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
49. 236 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
50. 244 S.C. 501, 137 S.E.2d 591 (1964).
[Vol. 18
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would met. Failure of the defendant to give a promised warning
before he started his car and pulled away from the truck caused
the plaintiff to fall in the path of the truck and sustain serious
injury. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court
stated that contributory recklessness was a jury issue and that
the doctrine of assumption of risk as set forth in Cooper v.
Mayes5' was inapplicable to the facts of this case. In the Cooper
case, that doctrine is formulated as follows:
Assumption of risk, in its true sense, rests in contract, not
tort. A true case of assumption of risk arises when an em-
ployee, without negligence on his part or that of his em-
ployer, is injured as the result of a hazard ordinarily inci-
dent to the proper performance of the duties of his
employment. When by his own negligence the employee
increases the hazard to which his work would normally
expose him, and as the result of such negligence and not of
any negligence of his employer sustains injury from the ab-
normal hazard which he has thus created, he is barred from
recovery by his own negligence. Where the extraordinary
hazard is attributable to the employer's negligence, but
would not have caused the injury except for the negligence
of the employee, the bar to recovery is not assumption of
risk, but contributory negligence. Where negligence enters
into the consideration of the rights of an injured employee
against his employer, the issue moves from the field of con-
tract into that of tort. Attempt in such cases to interrelate
assumption of risk and contributory negligence is more aca-
demic than practical, and sometimes loses sight of the fact
that the difference between the two is fundamental and not
merely of degree.
52
L. Defendant's Opportunity to Avoid
McCombs v. Anderson Truck Line53 was a wrongful death
action in which a truck driven by the defendant struck the car
driven by the plaintiff's eighty-four year old intestate when the
latter was turning at a "T" intersection at a time when the truck
was in its proper lane and so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard. The district court found that "the accident to and the
51. 234 S.C. 491, 109 S.E.2d 12 (1952).
52. Id. at 495-96, 109 S.E2d at 15.
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death of the plaintiff's intestate were caused solely or were con-
tributed to by the negligence and recklessness of the plaintiff's
intestate" 54 and that the defendant had no opportunity to avoid
the collision under the rule of Guytonv . Guyton55 in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated: "An automobile may not
be controlled by brakes or steering so as to avoid a hazard which
becomes apparent for only a split second before the point of
impact is reached.150 Use by the court of the term "opportunity"
instead of "last clear chance" to avoid is explained by the court's
finding as a matter of law that wrong or negligence on the part
of the defendant was not established by the facts. The district
court stated in the recent case of Page v. United States :5
The law with reference to the doctrine of last clear chance
in South Carolina seems now to be settled. In Jones v. At-
lanta-Charlotte Air Line R. . . . , the Supreme Court said:
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk
of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may
recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding
the harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exer-
cise of reasonable vigilance and care, and (b) the defendant
(1) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the help-
less peril involved therein; or (2) knows of the plaintiff's
situation and has reason to realize the peril involved therein;
or (3) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and
thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had
he exercised the vigilance which it was his duty to the plain-
tiff to exercise, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."58
Compare the McCombs case with Heming v. Boyd59 in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
[W]e have held that where a motorist is proceeding with
due regard to the law of the road and the regulations gov-
erning the operation of his vehicle, he is not generally liable
for injuries received by a child who enters the highway so
54. Id. at 28.
55. 244 S.C. 357, 137 S.E.2d 273 (1964).
56. Id. at 361, 137 S.E.2d at 275.
57. 212 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
58. Id. at 670 (emphasis added.) This formulation is taken from RESTATE-
xENT, ToRTs § 479 (1934).
59. 245 S.C. 284, 140 S.E.2d 246 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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suddenly that its driver cannot stop or otherwise avoid
injuring him .... However, where the driver of a vehicle
knows, or should know, that children may reasonably be ex-
pected to be in, near, or adjacent to the street or highway, he
is under a duty to anticipate the likelihood of their running
into or across the roadway in obedience to childish impulses,
and to exercise due care under the circumstances for their
safety.60
ff. Comparative Negligence
Oliver v. Blakeney,61 a case in which the defendant's truck
stopped on the highway ahead of the plaintiff without prior
warning, holds that in order to sustain the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, "it must appear that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory recklessness as a matter of law, since simple con-
tributory negligence would not constitute a defense to reckless
or wilful conduct.1
62
N1. Imputation of Driver's Negigene to Passenger
The defense that the negligence of another was imputable to
the plaintiff was rejected in three collision cases last year. In
Ray v. Simon,63 a case where a young girl was injured while rid-
ing in an automobile driven by her mother, the supreme court
stated: "The test, when we undertake to impute to the plaintiff
the negligence of her driver is whether such driver was her agent,
or did she have any control over the management of the auto-
mobile."
64
In Gray v. Barnes,65 a case in which a guest passenger was
injured while on a pleasure ride in a car driven by a fellow teen-
ager, the supreme court stated: "Appellants here have failed to
carry the burden of showing that Respondent had any right or
control over the car or to direct its movements to the extent of
creating a joint enterprise." 66
60. Id. at 290, 140 S.E.2d at 249.
61. 244 S.C. 565, 137 S.E2d 772 (1964).
62. Id. at 569, 137 S.E.2d at 774; accord, Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508,
123 S.E.2d 857 (1962). See 13 S.C.L.Q. 405-06 (1961).
63. 245 S.C. 346, 140 S.E2d 575 (1965).
64. Id. at 359, 140 S.E.2d at 581.
65. 244 S.C. 454, 137 S.E2d 594 (1964).
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In Davenport v. United States,67 the defendant agreed that the
alleged negligence of a father could not be imputed to the plain-
tiff, his minor son, who was riding with him when injured. In
all three cases, the test applied derives from Rock v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R.68 -expressly in the cases of Ray and Gray and
in Davenport by reference to Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R.60 which in turn cites Rock as the most recent case pertain-
ing to the imputed negligence issue.70 The supreme court in Rock
stated:
In order to constitute a joint enterprise so that the negligence
of the driver of an automobile may be imputed to an occu-
pant of the car, it is generally held that there must be a
common purpose and a community of interest in the object of
the enterprise and an equal right to direct and control the
conduct of each other with respect thereto . . . .Each must
have the control of the means or agencies employed to prose-
cute the common purpose.7 1
0. Manufacturer's Liability
In Gonzales v. Virginia-Carolina C/hem. Co., 72 the district
court found the defendant manufacturer liable to the plaintiff,
a well-qualified crop dusting pilot. The defendant's distribution
to the plaintiff of a poisonous defoliant without adequate tests,
without adequate warning and without making known or avail-
able a protective antidote was held to have been negligence per se
in that it violated the labeling requirements of federal73 and
South Carolina statutes.7 4 Even if the defendant's conduct had
satisfied statutory requirements, the court expressed its opinion
that, as a manufacturer of a hazardous material, the defendant
was still under a common law duty to make proper tests, and
give adequate warning and in general protect the public from
potential dangers arising out of the manufacture and sale of
such hazardous materials. Although this might be interpreted as
67. 241 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
68. 222 S.C. 362, 72 S.E.2d 900 (1952).
69. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
70. Id. at 137, 130 S.E.2d at 376.
71. 222 S.C. 362, 373, 72 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1952).
72. 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
73. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, §§ 1-13 as amended,
7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1964).
74. S.C. CODa ANN. §§ 3-151 to -176 (1962).
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extending the duty of the manufacturer beyond users of the
product to the public at large, latter portions of the Gonzales
opinion suggest a more restrictive intention on the part of the
court. The "failure of the manufacturer to exercise reasonable
care in the making of an article which if negligently made is
likely to cause injury to the person using it sounds in tort."
7
P. Proximate Cause
Finding that the negligence of the defendant had contributed
as a proximate cause to the plaintiff's injuries and damages in
the Gonzales case, the district court said: "Proximate cause in
the law is not necessarily the proximate cause of the logician,
but is determined upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense and experience, policy and precedent."7 6
Q. Premises Liability Cases
Licensees
In Franksel v. Kurtz,7 an action was brought by a seventy-
three year-old plaintiff with poor eyesight for injuries sustained
in a fall on the premises of her daughter as a result of stepping
in a grass covered ditch cut along a walkway-a hazard which,
it was alleged, was known to the defendant but not to the plain-
tiff. The case is of interest because both parties joined in classi-
fying the plaintiff as a "social guest," a term or category not
previously treated as such, or by such name, in South Carolina
common law, or by statute. The court was thus saddled with the
question of whether the classification connotes a definition of
variety and distinction all its own. The court decided that it does
not but that a "social guest" is the same as "social visitor,"
"guest," "gratuitous licensee" or "licensee," and that "with or
without an invitation to visit, the duty of the host is to refrain
from wilful and wanton injury."78
75. 239 F. Supp. 567, 573 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (emphasis added.)
76. Ibid.; accord, Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40
S.E.2d 681 (1946).
77. 239 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
78. The court further defined a licensee as follows:
A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter upon land by virtue of
the possessor's consent. The possessor is under no obligation to exercise
care to make the premises safe for his reception, and is under no duty
toward him except: (a) To use reasonable care to discover him and avoid
injury to him in carrying on activities upon the land. (b) To use reason-
able care to warn him of any concealed dangerous conditions or activities
which are known to the possessor, or of any change in the condition of
the premises which may be dangerous to him, and which he may reason-
able be expected to discover.
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Invitees
The case of Parker v. Stevenson Oil Co.79 resulted in a further
definition of the scope of the term "invitee." An action for per-
sonal injuries was brought in that case on behalf of the thirteen-
year-old plaintiff who came to the defendant's filling station
intending to purchase drinks and to use the rest room and was
injured by a fall into an unguarded grease pit. The injury oc-
curred at 8:30 p.m. after the station's lights had been switched
off and while the plaintiff was en route to the station's men's
rest room, the sidewalk to which was completely or partially
blocked at several points. It was assumed by the court without
challenge by the defendant that the station's vending machines
were in service and that the rest room door was unlocked.
Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise due
care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for his
use, the court stated, depended on whether the evidence was
legally sufficient to support the finding of fact, implicit in the
verdict, that the plaintiff was an invitee on the defendant's
premises at the time and place of injury. Defining an invitee
as one who enters upon the premises of another at the express
or implied invitation of the occupant, especially when he is upon
a matter of mutual interest or advantage, the court answered the
question in the affirmative.80
Children
In E verett v. White,8' an action was brought by the guardian
ad litem for the five-year-old plaintiff who sustained personal
injuries when he fell into a six-foot hole which contained water,
debris and other materials which had been excavated by the
defendant in the course of constructing a house. According to the
complaint, the defendant knew children were accustomed to play
on the premises where the hole was located and took no precau-
tion to guard or give warning of the hazard. From an order of
the circuit court overruling his demurrer, the defendant appealed
on the grounds that (1) the condition complained of was open
and obvious, even to small children, involved no latent peril or
hidden danger, and (2) that no facts were alleged showing that
the plaintiff was attracted to the hazard which caused his injury.
79. 245 S.C. 275, 140 S.E.2d 177 (1965).
80, Accord, Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580
(1962). See generally 95 A.L.R. 2d 1333 (1964) ; 38 Am. Jun. Negligence §
31 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 43(1), 44 (1950) ; PRossER, TORTs § 61 (3d
ed. 1964).
81. 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 582 (1965).
[Vol. 18
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 20
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/20
TORTS SURVEYED
In the light of the facts alleged and the appearance of the
hole, the court found that it was inferable that the small hole
practically filled with water, mud and other material, would not
have alerted a small child to the peril which it presented. In con-
sidering the second ground of appeal, the court surveyed a num-
ber of pertinent South Carolina cases. It pointed out that al-
though the early case of Bridges v. Asheville & iSpartanburg
R.R.12 which involved a turntable injury to a playing child, had
been referred to by the court as having followed the doctrine
announced in Sioux City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout,83 (the first of
what are known as the turntable or attractive nuisance cases),
the Bridges case was sustained, apparently, on ordinary concepts
of negligence and proximate cause. The court in Bridges stated
that a landowner was legally responsible for injuries from a
dangerous instrumentality located and left unguarded and un-
protected in an exposed place if the injuries were sustained by
a plantiff mentally incapable of knowing and appreciating the
danger either from want of age or otherwise. Although the later
case of Frank v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.84 is usually regarded
as resting on attractive nuisance doctrine, the opinion in that
case also recognized alternative grounds of recovery by children
in premises liability cases. Similar dicta in the opinions in Sexton
v. Noll Constr. Co.85 and McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills
Co.86 are noted by the court. Of Hancock v. Aiken Mills, 87 a case
cited by the defendant in support of his second position, the
court says that the opinion in that case "lends support to the
view that attraction by the hazard inflicting the injury is essen-
tial to recovery in a case tried solely on the theory of attractive
nuisance, but it does not trench upon any other ground of recov-
ery recognized by the prior decisions of this court. 88s The court
concludes: "[T]he complaint states a cause of action against the
defendant based upon actionable negligence independently of
those allegations which refer to the condition exposed by the
defendant as an attractive nuisance."8 9
82. 25 S.C. 24 (1885).
83. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874).
84. 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
85. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1916).
86. 109 S.C. 238, 95 S.E. 781 (1917).
87. 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
88. Supra note 81 at 338, 140 S.E.2d at 586.
89. See 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 28 (1950) ; PRossER, TORTS § 59 (3d ed. 1964);
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II. INDiGNITIs
A. False Imprisonment
Prosser v. Parsons0 was an action for false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and conversion of an automobile brought
against a game warden who arrested the plaintiff and procured
a warrant against him for hunting at night. After the grand jury
returned a "No Bill," the defendant, acting on the advice of the
circuit solicitor, took out another warrant and the grand jury
again entered a "No Bill." The defendant successfully appealed
a court of common pleas judgment against him.
Under the South Carolina Code and prior decisions,91 in order
for the defendant to have lawfully arrested the plaintiff, the
alleged violation must have occurred in the presence of the
defendant. Although the defendant had not personally observed
the plaintiff hunting in the nighttime but had only observed
him with the equipment for such sport, the court held that the
arrest was lawful because there were approximately ten game
wardens working together in the same general area keeping each
other informed by radio and that, "under those circumstances,
an act taking place within the view of one officer was in legal
effect within the view of the other co-operating officers."92
The 1965 session of the South Carolina Legislature enacted
(as code section 16-359.14) the following definition of the right
of merchants to investigate suspected shoplifters:
In any action brought by reason of having been delayed by
a merchant or merchant's employee or agent on or near the
premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of
investigation concerning the ownership of any merchandise,
it shall be a defense to such action if: (1) the person was
delayed in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time
to permit such investigation, and (2) reasonable cause ex-
isted to believe that the person delayed had committed the
crime of shoplifting.
90. 245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
91. S.C. CODE AN. § 1V-253 (1962); State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 116
S.E.2d 858 (1960).
92. In defining "false imprisonment," the court stated:
The essence of the tort of false imprisonment consists in depriving plain-
tiff of his liberty without lawful justification, and if the restraint or im-
prisonment complained of is lawful, the action fails. Thomas v. Colonial
Stores, Inc., 236 S.C. 25, 113 S.E.2d 337 (1960). The legality of an arrest
without warrant does not depend on the final results of the charge on
which the arrest was made.
Prosser v. Parsons, 245 S.C. 493, 498, 141 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1965).
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In Prosser v. Parsons, supra, the court further held that there
had been no malicious prosecution because the defendant had
probable cause and had acted on advice of counsel who was fully
cognizant of all material facts bearing on the case having pre-
pared both indictments and submitted them to the grand jury.
03
The court said:
[A] ctions for malicious prosecution . . . have never been
regarded with favor and are not encouraged as it is in the
interest of good order that criminals be brought to justice;
and it is generally held that the prosecutor is free from
damage if there be probable cause of the accusation made.0 4
In Gibson v. Brown,95 the plaintiff brought an action for
malicious prosecution against the defendant for having sworn
out a warrant against him for rape and burglary and against
her father for having aided and abetted her thus causing the
plaintiff to be arrested. Describing what, in general, must be
shown to authorize the maintenance of an action for malicious
prosecution, the court listed the following elements:
(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial pro-
ceedings, either civil or criminal; (2) by, or at the instance
of, the defendant; (3) the termination of such proceedings
in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting the proceed-
ings; (5) want of probable cause for the proceeding; and
(6) the suffering of injury or damage as a result of the
action or prosecution complained of.9 6
The father demurred to the facts on the ground that the com-
plaint only alleged acts on his part subsequent to the commence-
ment of prosecution by the daughter. Affirming the trial court's
order overruling the demurrer, the court held that one who has
not sworn out a warrant may be held liable in an action for
malicious prosecution if he had "instituted a* criminal action
against the plaintiff, or had caused one to be maintained or had
voluntarily aided or assisted in its prosecution."9 7
93. Also, the defendant's detention of the plaintiffs car under the circum-
stances was held to have been part of his duties as game warden according to
S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-457 (1962).
94. 245 S.C. 493, 502, 141 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1965).
95. 245 S.C. 547, 141 S.E.2d 653 (1965).
96. Id. at 549, 141 S.E2d at 654.
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In Rosemond 'v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co.98 the plaintiff com-
plained of alleged violation of his civil rights arising out of his
apprehension, arrest and physical abuse by highway patrolmen
(the individual defendants) with resulting personal injury, pain,
embarrassment and degradation. Although the Civil Rights
Act,00 under which the action was brought, was intended to give
a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges
and immunities by an official's abuse of his position "under color
of law," the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to
establish credible facts sufficient to impose liability on the de-
fendants who had arrested him in a routine driver's license check.
The plaintiff was treated in a manner which was not unreason-
able considering that he had been unable to produce a driver's
license, or registration certificate and had refused to get into the
patrol car and later tried to escape.
III. CoMMRnCIA, HARMS
A. rfraud
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record
in Park~s v. Morris Homes Corp.10 0 revealed, in the words of the
court,
a case of an ignorant negro woman, a widow, with two
daughters present of doubtful help and with no circum-
stances to incite suspicion, dealing with the agents of the
defendant who were experienced in the business of selling
shell homes, and who fraudulently misrepresented the nature
and contents of the instruments so as to obtain the signature
of the plaintiff thereto.10 1
The court stated the pertinent legal doctrine as follows:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the right to rely
upon representations as to the contents of a written instru-
ment must be determined in the light of the duty on the part
of the representee to use reasonable prudence and diligence
under the particular circumstances for his own protection.
In the application of this test to the conduct of the defrauded
98. 238 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1933 (1964).
l00. 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965).
101. Id. at 468, 141 S.E2d at 133.
[Vol. 18
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 20
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/20
TORTS SURVEYED
party, no fixed rule can be formulated, but the question must
be determined upon the facts of the particular case' 0 2 ....
What constitutes reasonable prudence and diligence with
respect to reliance upon a representation in a particular case
and the degree of fault attributable to such reliance will
depend upon the various circumstances involved, such as the
form and materiality of the representation, the respective
intelligence, experience, age, and mental and physical condi-
tion of the parties, the relation and respective knowledge of
the parties, etc.' 03 . . . . While the failure of the defrauded
party to read his contract before signing or to have it read
for him, will ordinarily bar him of recovery, this is not an
absolute rule. It is subject to the just doctrine that a wrong-
doer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law
to condemn the credulity of the ignorant and the unwary.10
Fiist v. Gallant'0 5 is another fraud case although, perhaps,
better described as an economic rather than a commercial harm.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, who were her husband
and father-in-law, jointly conspired and schemed to defraud her
in her case for separate maintenance by giving false testimony in
reference to the annual income of the defendant husband. In this
case of first impression in South Carolina, the district court gave
the following reason for denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss:
Under the circumstances here it would appear that the
public policy considerations which form the basis for deny-
ing causes of action based upon perjured testimony, are
overshadowed by the public interest behind the right to civil
redress of this plaintiff, who allegedly has been wronged by
the successful execution of a conspiracy, even though the
success of such alleged scheme was based primarily upon
the use of false testimony.
106
102. Id. at 467, 141 S.E.2d at 132; accord, Thomas v. American Workmen,
197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886 (1941).
103. 245 S.C. 461, 467, 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1965) ; accord, J. B. Colt Co. v.
Britt, 129 S.C. 266, 123 S.E. 845 (1924).
104. 245 S.C. 461, 467, 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1965).
105. 240 F. Supp. 827 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
106. Id. at 829. See generally 41 Am. Jim Perjury § 81 (1942); 15 CJ.S.
Conspiracy § 16 (1939). The former source states that although,
ordinarily aside from defamation and malicious prosecution, the courts
will not recognize any injury from false testimony upon which a civil
action for damages can be maintained, . . . it is apparently well settled
that where the giving of false testimony is only a part of the carrying
out of a scheme to defraud the plaintiff by means of the combination of
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B. Limitation of Liability by Contract
In Ptide v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,1°7 a dentist brought
an action to recover damages from the telephone company for
having listed under his name in the classified or yellow pages
an address and telephone number which not only were not the
plaintiff's but were those of another dentist. The advertisement
had been published pursuant to a written contract between the
parties, in which the liability of the defendant for errors in pub-
lication were limited to an amount not to exceed the charges for
such advertisement. The lower court overruled the plaintiff's
challenge by demurrer to the legal sufficiency of the defense on
the ground that such a limitation was against public policy and
public interest and so unenforceable. The court affirmed the
order below for the following reasons:
In our opinion the publication of plaintiff's ad was wholly
a matter of private contract. Such contracts are not required
to be filed with the South Carolina Public Service Commis-
sion and the Commission exercises no jurisdiction over this
feature of the defendant's telephone directory. The defend-
ant was not required to render an advertising service as a
part of its duties as a public utility. If the plaintiff had
not purchased the ad, he would have been deprived of no
service which the defendant was obligated, or assumed, to
render as a public service 08 . . . . The relationship of the
parties arose in connection with the publication of the ad
solely by reason of the contract and not by virtue of any duty
owed by the defendant to the public. 10 9
In his argument the plaintiff also raised the questions of whether
the limitation of the defendant's liability was not violative of
public policy (1) because of the absence of equality in bargain-
ing power, and (2) because the publishing error of the defendant
was negligently or wilfully made. Since the necessary factual
basis for an intelligent determination of the first question did
not appear in the pleadings and since the second question was
not raised or mentioned in the briefs, the court left the first open
for determination in the light of facts developed at the trial and
indicated no opinion about the second.
107. 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155 (1964).
108. Id. at 621, 133 S.E.2d at 157.
109. Ibid.; accord, Savannah Bldg. Supply Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R,
85 S.C. 405, 67 S.E. 1135 (1910).
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C. Covenant Not To Sue
Although it "considers a lawyer's files a sanctuary," the dis-
trict court reluctantly ordered the plaintiff in the private anti-
trust case of Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co.110 to turn over,
pursuant to rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
true copy of a purported covenant not to sue so that it could be
determined whether the purported agreement was a general
release of one alleged tort-feasor which would release all other
alleged tort-feasors including the defendant or a true covenant
not to sue which would operate simply to reduce the amount re-
coverable from any other joint tort-feasor.1i l
D. Copyright Infringement
In Bourne v. Fouche," 2 two music publishers brought joint
action for separate infringement of their respective copyright in
"San Antonio Rose" and "Mr. Sandman." The defendant pro-
prietors of the Skyline Club based their defense on a belief that
they were not responsible for infringing performances "if such
performances occurred without their knowledge or intent to in-
fringe, or if the performances were rendered by musicians en-
gaged as independent contractors, or if the performances were
rendered by such musicians contrary to defendants' instruc-
tions.". 3 In support of its holding that this defense was unavail-
ing, the district court quoted the following from the case of M.
Witmar & Sons v. Galloway:
The rule of the common law applies, to wit, that the master
is civilly liable in damages for the wrongful act of his serv-
ant in the transaction of the business which he was employed
to do, although the particular act may have been done with-
out express authority from the master, or even against or-
ders . . . .Assuming that the defendant did not intend to
infringe, the lack of intention does not affect the fact of
liability. The result, and not the intention, determines the
question of infringement."15
110. 240 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
111. Id. at 812.
112. 238 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
113. Id. at 746.
114. 22 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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Defendants were enjoined from permitting further perform-
ances of the two compositions.
In Edwin HI. Morris & Co. v. Munn,116 two other music pub-
lishers were granted similar injunctions against further infringe-
ment of their respective copyrights in "Sentimental Journey"
and "The Waltz You Saved for Me," and were awarded the same
statutory" 7 minimum damages of 250 dollars each as well as 250
dollars attorney's fees each and costs.
116. 233 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).
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